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1. Introduction1 
 
Like in many other European countries, the Belgian local governments underwent several 
changes during the last decade (Kersting & Vetter, 2003; Caulfield & Larsen, 2002). The fifth 
federal state reform in Belgium made the regional states responsible for the legislation of the 
local and provincial governments. This legislation is no longer a responsibility of the federal state 
(Reynaert & Steyvers, 2003). Every region in Belgium (the Flemish, the Walloon and the 
Brussels region) now has its own Local Government Act
2
. The Brussels LGA is not very 
different from the former federal LGA. The Flemish and the Walloon LGAs contain more 
innovations for the local governments. But the Flemish and the Walloon LGAs also differ from 
each other. Some articles of the Walloon LGA (Code de la Démocratie Locale et de la 
Décentralisation) cannot be found in the Flemish LGA and some of the articles of the Flemish 
LGA don‟t appear in the Walloon LGA. The appointment of the mayor is an example of the 
differences between both LGAs. The Flemish government appoints the mayor out of the group of 
the elected local councillors. In the Walloon region the candidate who received most votes in the 
election and whose party is the biggest party in the coalition will become the mayor. Unlike the 
Flemish situation, the elections of the Walloon mayor are more focused on the person of the 
mayor. Another difference between both Acts is that the Walloon local council can introduce a 
constructive motion of mistrust against the whole board of mayor an aldermen or against one or 
more aldermen. This motion is only valid if the local council proposes a successor for the whole 
board or one or more aldermen. These elements are not included in the Flemish LGA. Because 
this research acts upon instructions from the Flemish government, we didn‟t examine the effects 
of the Walloon LGA. 
 
On the 6
th
 of July 2005 the Flemish Parliament voted the first Flemish LGA. Most articles of the 
Act came into operation on the 1
st
 of January 2007, after the local elections in October 2006. The 
newly appointed local governments could immediately start to implement the new LGA. 
Concerning the organizational structure of the local governments, the LGA introduces some 
features of the New Public Management. Setting up a management team and working with a 
strategic long-range plan should be a step forward into making the local administration more 
efficient and effective (Suykens, 2006). 
 
This paper focuses on the role the LGA tries to impose on the Flemish local governments and its 
councillors. We want to examine to what extent the instruments offered by the LGA to strengthen 
the role of the local council and its councillors effectively result in a strengthened council. 
Furthermore we want to investigate whether it‟s possible to change the local council‟s 
functioning by an act or, as in this case, a decree. The next chapter pays attention to the changes 
for the local councillors since the introduction of the LGA. Subsequently we discuss our research 
design. We made an appeal to the local councillors‟ perceptions about the LGA to measure the 
strengthening of the local council‟s role or the lack of strengthening. The following chapters deal 
                                                 
1
 This text is based on research conducted within the frame of the Policy Research Centre on Governmental 
organization in Flanders (SBOV II - 2007-2011), funded by the Flemish government. The views expressed herein are 
those of the authors and not those of the Flemish government. 
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 We will use the abbreviation „LGA‟ to refer to the Local Government Act. The Flemish and Walloon regions 
legislate decrees and the Brussels region legislates ordinances. To keep it clear we will use the term „Local 
Government Act‟.  
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with the results of this extensive survey. The most important goal of this paper is to check to what 
extent the local councillors are able to notice a shift towards a strengthened council as a 
consequence of the use of the several instruments offered by the LGA. 
 
2. The role of the local council according the Flemish LGA 
 
The LGA emphasizes some general goals for the local governments. Examples of these goals are 
to grant the local administration an essential role in the management cycle, to organize a 
cooperation between the elected councillors and the local administration and to modernize the 
local financial policy. Concerning the role of the political bodies the LGA aims at a strengthening 
of the local council and the position of the elected councillors. The Explanatory Memorandum of 
the LGA translates this strengthening as: 
 
- the regulation of the local government‟s competences, which allows the local council to 
navigate on the main policy lines; 
- a transparent regulation to designate the council‟s chairman, the aldermen and to appoint 
the mayor; 
- a clear-cut profile of the elected council with regard to the executive board; 
- stronger instruments for an effective democratic control on the board and the 
administration. 
 
Not so much by imposing obligations, but by offering several instruments to the local 
governments, the LGA attempts to realize a strengthening of the local council‟s role (Reynaert & 
Steyvers, 2006). Every municipality is able to decide to what extent they will make use of these 
instruments. 
This set of instruments offered by the LGA is rather limited, certainly if we compare the LGA 
with „De Proeve van Vlaams Gemeentedecreet‟, a proposal written by some academics by order 
of the Flemish Government after the fifth federal state reform. According to „De Proeve‟, mayors 
and aldermen would, after their election, no longer be a member of the local council. The council 
would choose its own chairman. Like the Walloon LGA the council would be capable of 
introducing a constructive motion of mistrust against the complete board or one or more 
aldermen. „De Proeve‟ considered the combination of a local mandate and a federal or regional 
mandate as incompatible (Maes & Boes, 2001). There were also some attempts to evolve towards 
a directly elected mayor, but these attempts eventually failed. 
 
The final version of the LGA is less far-reaching than the several unsuccessful attempts to 
construct a new act. So which instruments does the LGA provide to realize a strengthening of the 
local council? The first instrument is the possibility to disconnect the function of the mayor and 
the local council‟s chairmanship. According to the Explanatory Memorandum “the possibility to 
appoint a councillor, who isn’t member of the executive board, as the council’s chairman can 
contribute to the strengthening of the council’s role as a supervising body with regard to the 
executive board of mayor and aldermen”. A local councillor who doesn‟t exercise an executive 
mandate would have a more independent position as a chairman with regard to the executive 
board. 
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A second instrument proposed by the LGA to the council is the possibility to delegate 
competences to the board on an extensive scale. By delegating these competences the council will 
have more time to focus on making more important policy choices and the council will have to 
make less detailed decisions. 
The LGA aims at a strengthening of the council‟s controlling role and refers to the right of the 
councillors to interpellate and to inspect local government‟s documents. The New Government 
Act, the preceding LGA, already offered these rights to the councillors. These rights consist of 
the possibility to ask the board of mayor and aldermen oral and written questions, the right to add 
agenda items to the council‟s agenda, the right to inspect all documents concerning local 
government and the right to visit all institutions founded and managed by the local government. 
These instruments aren‟t an innovation at all for the local councillors in contrast to the 
disconnection of the mayoral function and the council‟s chairmanship and the possibility to 
delegate competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. If the local councillors think that the 
local council‟s role has been strengthened, we expect this rather to be a consequence of the real 
innovations of the LGA and not so much a consequence of the rights that already existed. 
Furthermore the LGA offers the local governments a legal framework to appoint a staff to 
support the cabinet of the mayor and the aldermen, and the council‟s political parties. This staff  
can help local councillors to prepare themselves for the local council‟s meetings. In 2008 though 
we concluded that only three municipalities implemented the possibility to appoint a staff to 
support the local councillors. Therefore we will not further investigate the effects of this staff. 
The only obligatory innovation of the LGA is that members of the board of mayor and aldermen 
are not allowed to be a local committee‟s chairman. As a consequence especially majority 
councillors become a chairman rather than opposition councillors. About 10% of these chairmen 
are opposition councilors (Olislagers et al., 2008). We will not discuss this chairman‟s role 
because this paper is limited to the local council‟s role and its committees are therefore excluded. 
 
3. Research design 
 
This paper is based on data collected from all local councillors, including mayors and aldermen. 
These data are part of an extensive research organized in December 2008 and January 2009. 
Measuring the several local councillors‟ perceptions about the LGA was the most important 
purpose of this research. A questionnaire appeared to be the best method to measure perceptions 
(Billiet, 1992; Swanborn, 1987). To reach as many respondents as possible we didn‟t organize a 
survey. We made an appeal to the opinions of every mayor, alderman and councillor. More than 
7000 local politicians received a questionnaire. We contacted every group (mayors, aldermen, 
councillors) in several ways. The graph below shows the response rates during the several rounds 
that were organized to reach all local councillors. 
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Graph 1: Response questionnaire 
 
The questionnaires for the mayors were sent by post to the town hall. This was the first round and 
31% of the mayors filled in their questionnaire. Mayors who didn‟t answer after this first round 
received a second letter by post encouraging them to fill in the questionnaire. 13% of all mayors 
reacted to this letter. Finally we sent the mayors who didn‟t react after these two rounds an e-mail 
including the questionnaire. Eventually 52% of all mayors took part in our research. 
The aldermen received a questionnaire by post at the town hall, just like the mayors did. 19% of 
all aldermen participated in this first round. Due to the anonymity of the questionnaire it was 
impossible to check whether or not an alderman from a certain municipality had already filled in 
his questionnaire. Therefore we sent every alderman an e-mail including two messages. The first 
message thanked the aldermen who posted their questionnaire. The second message requested the 
other aldermen to fill in their questionnaire. After this e-mail 8% of the aldermen reacted. We 
didn‟t organize a third round. This would be confusing for the aldermen who already filled in 
their questionnaire after the first round, because they would receive a third call to participate. In 
total 23% of the aldermen took part in our research. 
The first round to contact the local councillors without an executive mandate consisted of two 
parts. The majority of the councillors (64%) received an e-mail including the questionnaire. We 
couldn‟t find the e-mail addresses of all local councillors. Those councillors got their 
questionnaire delivered by post at their home addresses. We found this information on the 
websites of the municipalities. 11% of the local councillors filled in their questionnaire after this 
first round. During the second round we contacted the councillors again whose e-mail addresses 
we found.
3
 Finally we decided to stop contacting the councillors after these two rounds. Only 5% 
of the local councillors decided to fill in the questionnaire after the second round. The total 
response is rather low (16%). Other recent studies involving Belgian and Dutch local councillors 
demonstrated that it‟s hard to persuade local councillors to take part in such research with 
questionnaires (Verhelst e.a., 2010; Berenschot, 2004). The total response of all local councillors 
(mayors, aldermen and councillors without an executive mandate) is 20% (N=1418). Distortions 
of  the results are rather limited (Olislagers et al., 2010). However, we suspect that more active 
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 Similar to the second round with the aldermen, some councillors without an executive mandate got confused after 
this second round. Councillors didn‟t always answer the questionnaire with the e-mail address we used to contact 
them. Those councillors also received a second e-mail to fill in the questionnaire, although they already answered the 
questionnaire. For this reason we didn‟t organize a third round to contact the councillors. 
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and motivated local councillors, who show some interest in the new LGA, decided to fill in the 
questionnaire. 
We contacted the local councillors in three different ways, depending on their function in local 
government. We are capable of making distinctions between the mayors‟, aldermen‟s and 
councillors‟ perceptions about the LGA. When necessary and interesting in this paper we will 
split the answers of these three different groups to explain their perceptions. 
 
4. Strengthening of the local council’s role 
 
Previously we described the instruments offered by the LGA to strengthen the local council‟s 
role. We measured the strengthening of the local council based on the following statements: 
 
- the local council‟s role as a controlling body has been reinforced in my municipality; 
- the debating quality during the local council‟s meetings has improved; 
- the local council has developed a long-term vision. 
 
The first statement refers to the LGA‟s goal to exercise an effective democratic control over the 
executive board and the local administration. The second statement indicates whether the local 
council has adopted a sharpened profile towards the board of mayor and aldermen. The third 
statement refers to the development of a long-term vision in the local council and a local council 
that is focused on the main lines of the local policy instead of discussing details. We submitted 
these statements to the local councillors in our questionnaire. These three statements were 
presented in a five-point scale.
4
 The next table illustrates the distribution of the answers of all 
local councillors, including mayors and aldermen. 
 
 
% disagree 
% neither disagree/ 
nor agree 
% agree Ntot 
The local council‟s role as a 
controlling body has been 
reinforced in my municipality. 
43,8 33,2 23,0 1325 
The debating quality during the 
local council‟s meetings has been 
improved. 
57,1 25,3 17,6 1334 
The local council has developed a 
long-term vision. 
53,6 25,8 20,6 1362 
Table 1: Strengthening of the local council 
 
We asked the local councillors whether they noticed changes towards a strengthened local 
council since the introduction of the new Flemish LGA. The answers for the three statements in 
table 1 demonstrate an almost identical pattern. According to about one fifth of all mayors, 
aldermen and local councillors the local council‟s role as a controlling body has been reinforced, 
the debating quality during the local council‟s meetings has improved and the local council has 
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 We also inserted the possibility to answer “don‟t know”, but these answers are considered to be missing values, 
because only a limited number of local councillors answered this. 
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developed a long-term vision. A majority of all local councillors disagrees that the debating 
quality has improved and that the local council has developed a long-term vision. 44% of all local 
councillors is not convinced that the local council‟s role as a controlling body has been reinforced 
since the introduction of the LGA. A limited number of local councillors admits that their local 
council evolves towards a strengthened council. There are some differences of opinion between 
the mayors, the aldermen and the local councillors without an executive mandate. The local 
councillors assert more often, in comparison with the mayors and the aldermen, that the debating 
quality in the council has improved and that the local council has developed a long-term vision. 
The table below shows the opinions of the mayors, the aldermen and the local councillors 
separately. Only the respondents who agreed with these statements are presented in this table. 
 
 Mayors Aldermen Councillors P 
The local council‟s role as a controlling body 
has been reinforced in my municipality. 
22,9% 
N = 36 
22,7% 
N = 89 
23,1% 
N = 179 
.000 
The debating quality in during local council‟s 
meetings has been improved. 
12,7% 
N = 20 
14,2% 
N = 57 
20,4% 
N = 158 
.021 
The local council has developed a long-term 
vision. 
18,1% 
N = 28 
15,9% 
N = 65 
23,6% 
N = 188 
.027 
Table 2: Strengthening of the local council according the councillors’ function 
 
About one fourth of the local councillors without an executive mandate thinks that the local 
council‟s role as a controlling body has been reinforced, that the debating quality during the local 
council‟s meetings has improved and that the local council has developed a long-term vision. 
Mayors and aldermen agree with the local councillors concerning the council‟s role as a 
controlling body. Unlike the local councillors without an executive mandate, the mayors and 
aldermen notice less positive changes in the debating quality of the local council‟s meetings and 
the development of a long-term vision in the council. Mayors and aldermen are the least 
convinced that the debating quality during the local council‟s meetings has improved. 
 
Both table 1 and table 2 show us that the answers of all local councillors for these three 
statements exhibit a similar pattern. We discovered mediocre (> .300) and strong (> .500) 
correlations between these statements (Field, 2009). Local councillors who agreed with one of 
these statements are inclined to agree with the other statements. Those councillors who disagree 
with a particular statement are also inclined to disagree with the other statements. Next we 
control whether these statements aren‟t measuring the same factor. By using a factor analysis in 
SPSS we searched for a correlation between the statements. We did find one factor and the 
reliability analysis confirmed that we are dealing with a reliable scale (Cronbach‟s Alpha > .700). 
Now we are able to merge these three variables (statements) into one new variable, which from 
now on we will call „strengthening of the local council‟. Table 3 presents the scores for this new 
variable. We split this variable in three, about equal, categories. The low group contains local 
councillors who don‟t notice many changes in the local council‟s functioning. The high group 
agrees that the local council is evolving towards a strengthened council. The middle group 
consists of local councillors whose scores for this new variable are not as low as the low group 
and not as high as the high group. 
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 Low Middle High Ntot 
Strengthening of 
the local council 
36,9% 42,1% 21,0% 1388 
Table 3: Strengthening of the local council (three categories) 
 
This table is actually a summary of table 1. About one fifth of all local councillors agreed with 
the three statements. The scores of this new variable „strengthening of the local council‟ range 
from 3 (totally disagree) to 15 (totally agree). The low group contains local councillors whose 
answers for this new variable fluctuate between 3 and 6. The answers of the middle group range 
from 7 to 9. The high group scored 10 to 15. Local councillors were also able to respond „don‟t 
know‟. These councillors were excluded when we constructed the new variable „strengthening of 
the local council‟. Most councillors are situated in the middle category. Instead of working with 
the three statements separately, we will now use this new variable „strengthening of the local 
council‟ as our dependent variable. We merge the mayors‟, aldermen‟s and local councillors‟ 
answers. The difference in opinions between the three types of councillors is not statistically 
significant. We will use the term local councillors for all local councillors, including those who 
exercise an executive mandate. We will explicitly mention when we examine the three groups 
separately.  
In our questionnaire we gathered some features about the local councillors. Now we can use these 
features to acquire a more profound insight into the strengthening of the local council‟s role. For 
example, we found some significant evidence that majority and opposition local councillors are 
not of the same opinion that the local council has been strengthened. The local councillors‟ 
education level also causes significant differences in their opinions. We split their education level 
in two categories. Whether or not the councillors have a university degree  separates them in two 
groups. Finally we also examine the local councillors‟ experience in their current function in the 
local government. We split this experience in three categories. The first category contains local 
councillors with at most two years of experience in their current function. They are only used to 
work with the new LGA. They can‟t make any comparisons with the previous situation. The 
second category consists of local councillors with at least three and at most eight years of 
experience. The third category is formed by local councillors with at least nine years of 
experience. These local councillors are capable of comparing several local councils‟ functioning 
in their municipality. The following table calculates the independent t-tests for these features. 
This t-test presents the average scores obtained by each group of local councillors on the variable 
„strengthening of the local council‟. This table also illustrates the percentage of councillors that 
was found in the high category of table 3.  
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  Strengthening of the 
local council 
Std.dev. % high N 
Majority  
opposition 
Opposition 7,08 2,49 17,7 390 
Majority 7,71 2,45 22,3 998 
p = .000 
Education level No university 7,82 2,52 25,1 821 
University 7,09 2,33 14,9 565 
p = .000 
Experience ≤ 2 years 7,57 2,64 23,6 592 
3 – 8 years 7,58 2,34 20,1 394 
≥ 9 years 7,41 2,34 17,9 396 
p = .518 
Table 4: Strengthening of the local council according to features of the local councillors 
 
This table also includes the local councillors with an executive mandate. Of course these 
councillors belong to the local majority. The majority councillors admit more often than the 
opposition councillors that the local council‟s role has been reinforced. The opinions of the 
opposition councillors are comparable with the opinions of the local councillors with a university 
diploma. These highly educated councillors disagree more often in comparison with the less 
highly educated councillors that the local council‟s role has been strengthened. The local 
councillors‟ experience doesn‟t significantly influence their opinion on the strengthening of the 
local council. Although, we notice the more experienced the local councillors are, the less they 
record a strengthening of the local council‟s role. In the following chapters we will discuss the 
instruments offered by the LGA to strengthen the local council‟s role and we will examine to 
what extent these instruments contribute to the strengthening of the local council. 
 
4.1 Local council’s chairman 
 
The disconnection of the function of the mayor and the local council‟s chairmanship is not only a 
Belgian discussion. In several other European countries this disconnection caused or still causes 
debate. This separation of both functions reminds us of the dualistic process in the Dutch 
municipalities. The disconnection of the function of the mayor and the council‟s chairmanship is 
not included in the Dutch LGA. The Dutch mayor is still the local council‟s chairman, although 
the mayor is not entitled to vote in the council (De Groot, 2009; Steen, 2007). 
The Flemish local councillors appoint the local council‟s chairman among the elected local 
councillors. The Explanatory Memorandum advises the local governments to appoint a local 
councillor who doesn‟t exercise an executive mandate as the local council‟s chairman if they 
want to pursue a clear-cut separation between the local policy and the local management. The 
Memorandum refers to two advantages if the local council‟s chairman doesn‟t combine his 
function with an executive mandate. One advantage is to reinforce the local council‟s role as a 
controlling body. A more independent position of the local council with regard to the board of 
mayor and aldermen is the other advantage. The High Council for Internal Authorities
5
 had some 
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 The High Council for Internal Authorities is an advisory body. One of its most important tasks is to recommend the 
internal affairs of government. The High Council counts 16 members. 3 members are experts in the internal affairs, 8 
members represent the Association of Flemish Municipalities and Cities and 5 members represent the Association of 
Provinces. 
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serious doubts about the separation of these functions. The High Council considered the council‟s 
chairman to be a half-hearted figure because the chairman wasn‟t given any extra competences. 
Moreover the High Council criticized the lack of an extensive profile and the lack of a supporting 
staff for this independent chairman (Hoge Raad voor Binnenlands Bestuur, 2005). Eventually one 
third of the Flemish municipalities decided to separate the mayoral function and the local 
council‟s chairmanship (Binnenband, 2005). 
 
We examine whether the disconnection of the function of the mayor and the local council‟s 
chairmanship influences the strengthening of the local council‟s role according to the local 
councillors. By using a t-test we compare the average scores granted by the local councillors to 
this variable „strengthening of the local council‟. The higher this score, the more the local 
councillors are convinced of the strengthening of the local council‟s role. 
 
 Strengthening of 
the local council 
Std.dev. % high Ntot 
Mayor = council‟s chairman 7,39 2,45 19,3 888 
Mayor ≠ council‟s chairman 7,81 2,48 23,9 476 
p = .002 
Table 5: Strengthening of the local council according to the local council chairmanship 
 
The separation of the mayoral function and the local council‟s chairmanship has a positive effect 
on the strengthening of the local council‟s role according to all local councillors. Local 
councillors who experienced a disconnection of the function of the mayor and the local council‟s 
chairmanship notice more often a strengthening of the local council. Although there isn‟t a big 
difference between both groups. However, the results are significant. 
 
In table 4 we concluded that the opposition and the higher educated local councillors were less 
convinced of the local council‟s strengthening compared to the majority and less highly educated 
local councillors. In the next table we want to examine to what extent these rather critical local 
councillors differ from each other when the local council‟s chairmanship and the mayoral 
function are disconnected. We also include the local councillors‟ experience. Only the most 
experienced local councillors are shown in the next table. The local councillors‟ level of 
experience didn‟t significantly influence their opinions on the strengthening of the local council. 
Although in the next table we include the local councillors with the most years of experience, 
because they are most capable of comparing the local council‟s functioning before and after the 
introduction of the LGA. This table also illustrates the percentage of local councillors situated in 
the high category of table 3. 
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  Means Std.dev. % high N 
Opposition local 
councillors 
Mayor = chairman 7,09 2,52 19,1 256 
Mayor ≠  chairman 6,99 2,43 13,8 123 
p = .435 
Higher educated 
local councillors 
Mayor = chairman 6,81 2,22 11,5 357 
Mayor ≠  chairman 7,59 2,43 20,6 199 
p = .000 
Most experienced 
local councillors 
(≥ 9 years) 
Mayor = chairman 7,26 2,34 17,0 247 
Mayor ≠  chairman 7,71 2,26 19,3 135 
p = .243 
Table 6: Strengthening of the local council according to the local council’s chairmanship 
and the more critical local councillors 
 
Table 7 doesn‟t show many significant results. Opposition councillors in municipalities with a 
separation of the mayoral function and  the council‟s chairmanship less often see a strengthening 
of the local council‟s role than opposition councillors in municipalities without this 
disconnection. The differences between both groups aren‟t significant, though. In the category of 
the higher educated councillors the separation of the function of the mayor and the council‟s 
chairmanship plays a significant role in their opinions on the local council‟s strengthening. These 
councillors are more often convinced of the local council‟s strengthening if the mayoral function 
and the chairmanship are separated. Just like the opposition councillors, we couldn‟t find a 
significant difference between the most experienced councillors. Thus the separation of the 
function of the mayor and the local council‟s chairmanship hasn‟t got much influence on the 
more critical local councillors. 
 
4.2 Delegation to the board of mayor and aldermen 
 
Another instrument to enable the local council to focus on the main lines of local policy and to 
make important decisions concerning the local politics is the local council‟s possibility to 
delegate several competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. The local council‟s 
competences to determine local regulations, to levy taxes and to provide the local budget can in 
no case be delegated to the board of mayor and aldermen. The LGA offers a limited list of 
competences which can‟t be delegated by the local council. Examples of this limited list are the 
competence to determine the local long-range plan or the local organization chart, the 
competence to appoint and to hire the city manager and the city clerk and the competence to 
approve the internal controlling system. In the summer of 2008 70% of the city managers said 
that the local council entrusted some competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. In the 
majority of these municipalities this delegation only involved competences of daily government. 
Only in a few municipalities this delegation consisted of more competences than only this daily 
government, for example the competence to appoint the members of the local management team 
(Olislagers et al., 2008). 
 
In our questionnaire we presented the local councillors some questions about this possibility to 
delegate to the local board. On the one hand we asked the local councillors whether they believed 
that the delegation of competences to the board wasn‟t far-reaching enough. On the other hand 
we measured to what extent the local councillors were convinced that the local councillors in 
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their municipality are reluctant to delegate more competences. The local councillors received 
these statements in a five-point scale. 
 
 % disagree 
% neither 
disagree/ nor agree 
% agree Ntot 
The delegation of competences to 
the local board isn‟t far-reaching 
enough in my municipality. 
55,0 23,4 21,5 1348 
The local councillors in my 
municipality are reluctant to 
delegate more competences to the 
board of mayor and aldermen. 
28,0 34,5 37,5 1296 
Tabel 7: Delegation of competences from the local council to the board 
 
Despite the rather limited delegation to the board of mayor and aldermen, as shown by a 
questionnaire we organized in 2008, a majority of all local councillors thinks that the delegation 
of competences to the board of mayor and aldermen is far-reaching enough. One fifth of all local 
councillors is convinced that the delegation of competences to the board isn‟t far-reaching 
enough. The local councillors admit more often that the local councillors in their municipalities 
are reluctant to delegate more competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. 38% of all local 
councillors agrees with this last statement and 28% of all local councillors disagrees. We split the 
local councillors‟ answers according to their function in local government so we can discuss 
these statements with more accuracy. 
 
 Mayors Aldermen Councillors p 
The delegation of competences to 
the local board isn‟t far-reaching 
enough in my municipality. 
17,3% 
N = 27 
22,4% 
N = 90 
22,0% 
N = 174 
.000 
The local councillors in my 
municipality are reluctant to 
delegate more competences to the 
board of mayor and aldermen. 
29,1% 
N = 44 
34,5% 
N = 133 
40,7% 
N = 309 
.004 
Table 8: Delegation according to the function of the local councillors 
 
If we look at the answers of the different local councillors we notice that according to 22% of the 
aldermen and the local councillors without an executive mandate the delegation of competences 
to the board of mayor and aldermen isn‟t far-reaching enough in comparison with 17% of the 
mayors. The second statement demonstrates a larger divergence of views between the several 
local councillors. 29% of the mayors, 35% of the aldermen and 40% of the local councillors 
without an executive mandate claim that the local councillors in their municipality are reluctant 
to delegate more competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. According to the local 
councillors there isn‟t yet much support for the delegation of competences to the board. About 
one fifth of all local councillors admits that the delegation of competences to the board isn‟t far-
reaching enough. Moreover, almost a majority of the local councillors agrees that the local 
councillors are reluctant to delegate more competences to the local board. 
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Till now we only discussed the perceptions of the local councillors on the possibility to delegate 
competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. Now we examine the effect of this delegation. 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum a possible effect of this extensive delegation is a 
local council that is concentrated on making the important policy decisions. A local council that 
is limited to focus on the main lines of the local policy also results in other, more practical, 
advantages for the functioning of the local council. One of the advantages is a decrease in the 
number of detailed discussions during the local council‟s meetings. The delegation of 
competences to the board of mayor and aldermen offers the possibility to adjust their policy to 
their own size and to introduce more diversity in the local government. The local governments 
are able to decide on their own how they will divide the competences. A possible consequence of 
this decision is that the local agenda items are limited to what is essential for the local 
government. Like the decrease in the number of detailed decisions and the number of agenda 
items, this delegation can limit the duration of the local council‟s meetings. To measure these 
effects, we presented the next statements to the local councillors: 
 
- the number of detailed decisions has decreased during the local council‟s meetings; 
- the number of agenda items has decreased during the local council‟s meetings; 
- the duration of the local council‟s meetings has decreased. 
 
Because we are dealing with actual questions, we didn‟t present these statements to the  local 
councillors in a five-point scale. The local councillors were able to answer „yes‟, „no‟ or „don‟t 
know‟. The following table illustrates the distribution of the answers. 
 
 
% yes % no 
% don‟t 
know 
Ntot 
The number of detailed decisions has 
decreased during the local council‟s 
meetings. 
38,8 43,1 18,1 1395 
The number of agenda items has decreased 
during the local council‟s meetings. 
30,8 55,0 14,3 1401 
The duration of the local council‟s 
meetings has decreased. 
29,3 58,0 12,7 1401 
Table 9: Effects of delegation 
 
Because the local councillors who answered „don‟t know‟ is a none negligible group, we include 
these councillors in table 9. Almost one fifth of all local councillors doesn‟t know whether the 
number of detailed decisions has decreased during the local council‟s meetings. Most local 
councillors (43%) disagree that the number of detailed decisions has decreased during the local 
council‟s meetings. More than one third of all local councillors (39%) agrees that the number of 
detailed decisions has decreased during the local council‟s meetings. A majority of all local 
councillors (55%) denies that the number of agenda items has shrunk during the local council‟s 
meetings. Less than a third of all local councillors (31%) agrees with this statement. We notice 
the same trend for the statement about the duration of the local council‟s meetings. A small 
majority (58%) disagrees that the duration of the local council‟s meetings has decreased. Less 
than a third of  all local councillors (29%) is convinced that the duration of the local council‟s 
meetings has decreased. Again we found some variation in the answers of the local councillors 
13 
 
according to their function in local government. The next table illustrates the percentage of 
mayors, aldermen and local councillors without an executive mandate that agreed with the 
statements in the previous table. 
 
 Mayors Aldermen Councillors p 
The number of detailed decisions 
during the local council‟s meetings. 
38,9% 
N = 61 
35,1% 
N = 144 
40,6% 
N = 336 
.000 
The number of agenda items has 
decreased during the local 
council‟s meetings. 
43,0% 
N = 68 
32,7% 
N = 134 
27,5% 
N = 833 
.000 
The duration of the local council‟s 
meetings has increased. 
38,6% 
N = 61 
33,4% 
N = 137 
25,6% 
N = 213 
.000 
Table 10: Effects of delegation according to the local councillors’ functions 
 
Almost an identical number of mayors, aldermen and local councillors without an executive 
mandate are convinced that the number of detailed decisions has decreased during the local 
council‟s meetings since the introduction of the LGA. Especially the mayors notice a decrease in 
the number of agenda items during the local council‟s meetings. One third of the aldermen and 
over one fourth of the local councillors join these mayors and agree that the number of agenda 
items has decreased. Again the mayors conclude more often than the aldermen and the local 
councillors without an executive mandate that the duration of the local council‟s meetings has 
decreased. One third of the aldermen and one fourth of the local councillors have the same 
opinions as these mayors. We can conclude from table 10 that the mayors, compared to the 
aldermen and councillors, are more often convinced that the local council evolves towards a local 
council as proposed by the LGA. 
The education level of the local councillors doesn‟t significantly influence their opinion on these 
statements. We found one significant result between the majority and the opposition councillors.
6
 
61% of the opposition local councillors agrees that the number of detailed decisions has 
decreased during the local council‟s meetings in comparison with 47% of the majority 
councillors. We also found one significant result for the local councillors‟ experience. 53% of the 
local councillors with at most two years of experience, 47% of the local councillors with three to 
eight years of experience and 42% of the local councillors with at least nine years of experience 
have the impression that the number of detailed decisions has decreased during the local 
council‟s meetings. The more experienced local councillors notice less changes in the local 
council‟s functioning in comparison with the less experienced local councillors. 
 
The delegation of competences to the board of mayor and aldermen is, as mentioned earlier, an 
instrument to strengthen the local council‟s role. Therefore we control to what extent a decrease 
in the number of detailed decisions, in the number of agenda items and in the duration of the local 
council‟s meetings influence the statement about the strengthening of the local council‟s role. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The „don‟t know‟-categorie is excluded here. 
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Strengthening of 
the local council  
Std.dev. % high N 
 
 detailed decisions 
No 7,56 2,41 19,9 593 
Yes 7,60 2,41 22,7 534 
p = .813 
 
 agenda items 
No 7,82 2,46 24,9 759 
Yes 7,26 2,29 15,3 426 
p = .000 
 
 duration local 
council‟s meetings 
No 7,64 2,41 23,0 804 
Yes 7,59 2,42 19,3 404 
p = .720 
Table 11: Effects of delegation on the strengthening of the local council’s role 
 
A decrease in the number of detailed decisions during the local council‟s meetings doesn‟t 
significantly influence the perceptions of the local councillors on the strengthening of the local 
council‟s role. From table 11 we can conclude that a decrease in the number of agenda items 
during the local council‟s meetings significantly influences the reinforcement of the local council. 
Although we get a reverse result compared to our expectations and the LGA‟s aim at 
strengthening the local council‟s role. Local councillors who don‟t notice a decrease in the 
number of agenda items during the local council‟s meetings assume more often that the local 
council‟s role has been strengthened in comparison with the local councillors who see a decrease 
in the number of agenda items. We can‟t find a significant result for a decrease in the duration of 
the local council‟s meetings. Although again the results don‟t correspond to the LGA‟s 
expectations. Local councillors who don‟t notice a decrease in the duration of the local council‟s 
meetings agree more often that the local council‟s role has been strengthened in comparison with 
the local councillors who confirm that the duration of the local council‟s meetings has decreased. 
 
4.3 Instruments for the local councillors7 
 
Like the disconnection of the mayoral function and the local council‟s chairmanship and the 
possibility to delegate competences to the board of mayor and aldermen, the LGA offers some 
individual instruments to the local councillors who don‟t exercise an executive mandate. These 
instruments should enlarge the local councillors‟ right of control and they should counterbalance 
the extensive possibility to delegate competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. Because 
the local council is able to assign more competences to the board, this board gets a larger 
responsibility. Therefore the local councillors should have enough instruments to control it. The 
LGA emphasizes the local council‟s assignment to determine the important political options and 
the important policy choices. The concrete interpretation of these policy choices relates to the 
local councillors‟ agenda as well as to the local council‟s meetings. Local councillors should have 
enough instruments to prepare themselves thoroughly for the local council‟s meetings. That‟s 
why every local councillor is allowed to add items to the local council‟s agenda. The agenda 
items should not only be described in a clear way, but should also contain an explained proposal 
of decision. The local councillors receive several instruments to exercise their controlling task. 
These instruments aren‟t an innovation, though. The former federal LGA gave the local 
                                                 
7
 When we talk about the local councillors in this chapter, we only talk about the local councillors without an 
executive mandate. 
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councillors the same instruments to control the board of mayor and aldermen. Therefore we 
examined to what extent the local councillors use these instruments and whether they notice any 
changes in the use of these instruments. The LGA distinguishes five types of rights for the local 
councillors. Local councillors have the right to peruse all files, documents and legal instruments 
concerning their local government. The local councillors can get a copy of all these files, 
documents and legal instruments. The local councillors have the right to visit all institutions and 
services founded and managed by the local government. Another way to control the board of 
mayor and aldermen is the local council‟s possibility to ask the members of the board oral and 
written questions. Since the introduction of the LGA the local councillors automatically receive a 
copy of the minutes of the board‟s meetings. Finally the local councillors are able to add agenda 
items to the local council‟s agenda. To investigate the frequent use of these instruments we asked 
the local councillors how often they use these instruments. The next table illustrates these results. 
Local councillors with an executive mandate aren‟t included in this table. 
 
 Never/ 
rarely 
Sometimes 
Often/ very 
often 
Ntot 
To visit institutions and services established 
and managed by the local government 
20,1 50,2 29,7 832 
To peruse all documents, files and legal 
instruments concerning local government. 
11,1 31,5 57,5 833 
To ask oral questions. 10,6 28,3 61,0 836 
To aks written questions. 46,4 31,0 22,5 835 
To add agenda items to the local council‟s 
agenda. 
51,3 29,1 19,7 833 
Table 12: Frequency of the use of the instruments for the local councillors 
 
This table shows a rather varied picture of the use of these instruments offered by the LGA. Local 
councillors admit that they frequently use the right to ask the board oral questions and the right to 
peruse all local documents. A majority of the local councillors asserts that they often to very 
often use these instruments. Almost one third of the local councillors (30%) claims that they 
often to very often visit the institutions and services established and managed by the local 
government. Almost one fourth of the local councillors (23%) often to very often asks the 
members of the board of mayor and aldermen written questions. Finally almost one fifth of the 
local councillors admits that they often to very often add agenda items to the local council‟s 
agenda. Table 12 illustrates that local councillors quite often use these instruments. We have to 
keep in mind that the local councillors who took part in this questionnaire are perhaps more 
motivated than other local councillors. Therefore we should not overrate the results of this table. 
 
We also asked the local councillors whether or not they consider these instruments to be 
unsatisfactory to prepare themselves to the local council‟s meetings. After all, the LGA didn‟t 
enforce any important changes to the local councillors‟ statute and the instruments mentioned in 
table 12 aren‟t new at all. Both the opinions of all local councillors and the opinions of the 
mayors, aldermen and local councillors separately are shown in the table hereunder. 
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  % disagree 
% neither disagree, 
nor agree 
% agree Ntot 
The local councillors 
don‟t get enough support 
to prepare themselves for 
the local counil‟s 
meeting. 
All councillors 49,2 17,5 33,3 1390 
Mayors 61,4 15,2 23,5 158 
Aldermen 60,7 16,6 22,5 409 
Councillors  41,1 18,3 40,6 823 
p = .000
8
 
Table 13: Support for the local councillors 
 
One third of all local councillors agrees that the local councillors don‟t receive enough support to 
prepare themselves for the local council‟s meetings. Depending on the function exercised by the 
councillors, the opinions about this statement differ quite a lot. Less than one fourth of the 
members of the board of mayor and aldermen believe that the local councillors don‟t get enough 
instruments to prepare themselves for the local council‟s meetings. The local councillors without 
an executive mandate clearly have another opinion than the members of the board of mayor and 
aldermen. 41% of the local councillors agrees that they don‟t receive enough instruments to 
prepare themselves. If we only have a look at the results of the local councillors, we find a 
significant difference between the opinions of the majority and the opposition local councillors. 
Almost half of the opposition local councillors (48%) confirms that they don‟t get enough 
support to prepare themselves in comparison with one third (34%) of the majority local 
councillors. 
 
Before we continue examining the changes in the strengthening of the local council, we further 
discuss these instruments. We suspect that local councillors who often use of one these 
instruments also intend to use the others more often. A factor analysis confirms this assumption.
9
 
Only the first statement in table 12, the right to visit institutions and services established and 
managed by the local government, doesn‟t seem to measure the same factor. The fact that local 
councillors are only able to visit these institutions and services during the office hours is a 
possible explanation. Because of these limited opening hours a large group of local councillors is 
excluded from the possibility to use this right to visit. Therefore we create a new variable, with 
the exception of the right to visit, which makes a distinction between the less and the more active 
local councillors. We split the scores for this new variable in three, about equally large, 
categories (low, middle, high). The low category contains the local councillors who don‟t 
frequently use these instruments. The high category consists of local councillors who (very) often 
use of the several instruments. The middle category finds itself between these two categories. The 
table below gives a summary of this new variable. 
 
  % local councillors N 
Activity of the local 
councillors 
Low 39,5 331 
Middle 34,6 290 
High 25,8 216 
Table 14: Activity of the local councillors 
 
                                                 
8
 The group „all local councillors‟ is not included in calculating p. 
9
 Cronbach‟s alpha = .676. Cronbach‟s alpha decreases (.653) if we add the first statement in table 12. 
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We also look at the local councillors‟ perceptions about the strengthening of the local council‟s 
role. We want to examine whether or not the more (or less) active local councillors notice more 
changes towards a strengthening of the local council‟s role. The following table shows these 
results. 
 
  
Strengthening of 
the local council 
Std.dev. % high N 
Activity of the 
local councillors 
Low 7,67 2,55 23,9 322 
Middle 7,49 2,71 23,3 283 
High 7,21 2,45 18,0 211 
p = .130 
Table 15: Strengthening of the local council according to the activity of the local councillors 
 
The differences between the groups are not statistically significant. However, we measure a 
descent in the average scores of the answers of these local councillors. The more often the local 
councillors use the several instruments, the less often they believe that the local council‟s role has 
been strengthened. The least active local councillors conclude most changes in the local council‟s 
functioning in comparison with the two other groups. 
 
Up till now we only examined to what extent the local councillors use the several instruments. 
However, these results don‟t tell us to what extent the local councillors notice changes in the use 
of these instruments. Therefore we asked the local councillors, including the members of the 
board of mayor and aldermen, to what extent they are convinced that, since the introduction of 
the LGA, : 
 
- the number of oral questions has increased during the local council‟s meetings; 
- the number of written questions has increased during the local council‟s meetings; 
- the local councillors add more agenda items to the local council‟s agenda. 
 
Just like the previous chapter about delegation, these statements were not presented in a five-
point scale, but as actual questions. Local councillors were able to answer „yes‟, „no‟ or „don‟t 
know‟. The table hereunder shows the local councillors‟ answers. 
 
 
% yes % no 
% don‟t 
know 
Ntot 
The number of oral questions has 
increased during the local council‟s 
meetings. 
36,0 49,4 14,7 1398 
The number of written questions has 
increased during the local council‟s 
meetings. 
27,0 55,9 17,2 1398 
The local councillors add more agenda 
items to the local council‟s agenda. 
30,4 56,1 13,5 1397 
Table 16: Perceptions about the instruments for the local councillors 
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A minority of all local councillors is convinced that the local councillors more often use the 
several instruments to control the members of the board of mayor and aldermen. Due to the large 
number (> 10%) of local councillors who didn‟t know the answer, we include these councillors. 
Almost half of all local councillors (49%) disagrees that the number of oral questions has 
increased in comparison with over one third (36%) of all local councillors who agrees with this 
statement. A majority of all local councillors (56%) denies that the number of written questions 
has increased during the local council‟s meetings. 27% of all local councillors believes that the 
number of written questions of the local councillors has increased. About one third of all local 
councillors (30%) notices an increase in the number of agenda items added to the local council‟s 
agenda. Like the previous statement, 56% of all local councillors disagrees with this statement. 
Next we spread the answers of the local councillors according to their function in the local 
government. The next table demonstrates the number of mayors, aldermen and local councillors 
without an executive mandate who agreed with these statements. 
 
 Mayors  Aldermen Councillors P 
The number of oral questions has 
increased during the local council‟s 
meetings. 
30,4% 
N = 48 
37,8% 
N = 155 
36,1% 
N = 300 
.000 
The number of written questions has 
increased during the local council‟s 
meetings. 
27,8% 
N = 44 
30,7% 
N = 126 
24,9% 
N = 207 
.000 
The local councillors add more agenda 
items to the local council‟s agenda. 
27,2% 
N = 43 
29,0% 
N = 119 
31,6% 
N = 262 
.000 
Table 17: Perceptions on the instruments for the local councillors according to their 
function in local government 
 
There aren‟t many differences between the mayors‟, the aldermen‟s and the local councillors‟ 
opinions. The mayors are less often convinced that the number of oral questions has risen in 
comparison with the aldermen and the local councillors without an executive mandate. The 
mayors and the aldermen confirm more often than the local councillors that the number of written 
questions has increased. About as many mayors, aldermen and local councillors notice a rise in 
the number of agenda items added by the local councillors. 
 
To what extent the local councillors use the several instruments as we saw in table 14 doesn‟t 
play a significant role in the local councillors‟ perceptions on the local council‟s strengthening. 
We couldn‟t find a significant relation between the use of these instruments and the statements in 
table 17. So local councillors who describe themselves as active councillors in using the 
instruments to control the members of the board aren‟t more often convinced that there is an 
increase in the use of these instruments. In the following table we examine the relation between 
the statements in table 17 and the strengthening of the local council‟s role. We want to find out 
whether the increase in the number of oral and written questions of the local councillors and an 
increase in the number of agenda items added by the local councillors cause any changes in their 
opinions on a strengthening of the local council‟s role. 
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Strengthening of 
the local council 
Std.dev. % high N 
 
 oral questions 
No 7,20 2,21 14,7 681 
Yes 8,30 2,50 31,8 497 
p = .000 
 
 verbal questions 
No 7,29 2,30 16,5 772 
Yes 8,25 2,48 31,1 370 
p = .000 
 
 added agenda 
items 
No 7,30 2,33 16,5 775 
Yes 8,16 2,45 30,3 416 
p = .000 
Tabel 18: Effect instrumenten raadsleden op versterking gemeenteraad 
 
An increase in the amount of oral and written questions and the number of added agenda items by 
the local councillors leads to a strengthening of the local council‟s role. Local councillors who 
agree that the councillors more often use the instruments to control the members of the board 
show a more positive attitude about the strengthening of the local council‟s role. This time we 
don‟t see any reversed effects like we did in table 11. Although we have to remark that an 
increase in the use of these instruments doesn‟t tell us anything about the contents of the 
questions asked by the local councillors and the agenda items they add to the local council‟s 
agenda. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this paper was to investigate to what extent the instruments, offered by the new 
LGA, actually achieve their goal which is the strengthening of the local council‟s role. Two years 
after the settlement of the new local councils, there aren‟t many signs of a strengthening of the 
local council‟s role. According to the mayors and the aldermen as well as the local councillors 
without an executive mandate the number of radical changes in the local council are limited. This 
doesn‟t mean that nothing has changed since the introduction of the LGA. In municipalities 
where the mayoral function and the local council‟s chairmanship has been disconnected, the first 
signs of a strengthened local council appear. This measure seems to succeed in its intension. The 
possibility to delegate competences to the board of mayor and aldermen delivered an indistinct 
image of the local council‟s functioning. The local councillors are rather reluctant to delegate 
many competences to the board of mayor and aldermen. However, the delegation is already 
rather limited. Moreover the advantages of this delegation according to the LGA, like a decrease 
in the number of agenda items and the duration of the local council‟s meetings, have a reverse 
effect on the local council‟s strengthening. The instruments to control the members of the board 
of mayor and aldermen are not an innovation for the local councillors. These instruments already 
existed before the introduction of the LGA. Local councillors who use these instruments more 
often notice less changes in the local council‟s functioning. Local councillors who more often 
experience an increase in the use of these instruments are more often convinced that the local 
council‟s role has strengthened. 
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The LGA aims at a strengthening of the local council‟s role, but the local governments aren‟t 
obliged to use the instruments offered by the LGA. The use of these instruments is optional. Not 
one local government is obliged to separate the mayoral function and the local council‟s 
chairmanship. Moreover this chairman can‟t count on any extra supportive staff. Delegation from 
the local council to the board of mayor and aldermen is also optional and the instruments to 
control the members of the board aren‟t an innovation at all. 
 
In order for a local government to change the local council‟s functioning, the local councillors 
have to be convinced of the need to change the local council‟s functioning. In 2002 a support 
analysis for a new LGA concluded that the local councillors didn‟t experience an urgent need to 
change the local council‟s functioning radically. A majority of the local councillors was 
convinced that the local council exercised enough influence on the local policy. Moreover most 
of the local councillors didn‟t see many problems in a limited degelation to the local board 
(Meire et al., 2002). A few years before the introduction of the new LGA there didn‟t exist much 
support to change the local council‟s role. These conclusions correspond with the results of a list 
of case studies organized in the summer of 2008, one and a half year after the introduction of the 
new LGA. Neither the city managers, nor the members of the board of mayor and aldermen were 
convinced that the local council‟s role had been strengthened. A year after this first round of case 
studies these respondents had not changed their opinions yet. Local councillors seem to prefer to 
score with detailed remarks during the local council‟s meetings rather than to develop a long-
term vision (Olislagers et al., 2009). We also have to remark that it‟s impossible to consider the 
local councillors as one homogeneous group. Members of the board of mayor and aldermen had 
several times a difference of opinion with the local councillors who didn‟t exercise an executive 
mandate. Even the board of mayor and aldermen isn‟t a homogeneous group. To change the local 
council‟s functioning the several councillors will have to be in line with the idea that a change of 
the local council‟s functioning is necessary.  
 
The LGA aims at local council‟s meetings with well prepared local councillors. This means that 
the local councillors should have enough possibilities and instruments to prepare themselves 
thoroughly. The LGA doesn‟t change the local councillors‟ statute. Most of the local councillors 
without an executive mandate combine their political mandate with a regular job. The local 
councillors, without an executive mandate, in our survey spend an average of 7,63 hours per 
week on their task as a local councillor. In contrast with the members of the board of mayor and 
aldermen the local councillors receive a small monetary compensation. On the contrary the 
members of the board enjoy a salary, including a holiday allowance and an annual bonus. Instead 
of changing the local councillors‟ statute, the LGA offers the possibility to appoint a staff to 
support the local councillors. Hardly a handful of local governments has appointed such a staff. 
To change the local council effectively by an act (or decree) the LGA‟s instruments seem to be 
too limited. Due to the optional character of these measures, the local governments are not in a 
hurry to change the local council‟s functioning radically. Although we have to keep in mind that 
this measurement occurred scarcely two years after the introduction of the LGA. Structural 
changes won‟t manifest themselves in such a short notice. Moreover a majority of the local 
councillors is more used to work with the former federal LGA than with this new LGA. This 
process of awakening won‟t, if it effectively happens, occur rapidly.  
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